Probabilidad para el pago de soborno: aproximación multi-país para América Latina y el Caribe
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33304/revinv.v17n1-2022001Palabras clave:
Américas, corrupción, probabilidad estadística, regresión logística, sobornoResumen
El soborno como temática se ha centrado en análisis de causalidad e impacto y en muchos de los casos supeditado como una tipología más de la corrupción. A partir de los microdatos del Barómetro de Corrupción Global de Transparency International se busca determinar, para un conjunto de países seleccionados de América Latina y el Caribe, las variables dependientes para predecir la probabilidad de pagar soborno al tener contacto con las personas, empresas o entidades que le prestan servicio. Se utilizan técnicas de estadística inferencial, como la regresión logística, aplicando el método de máxima verosimilitud y proceso iterativo hasta encontrar el mejor modelo. De una encuesta inicial con 117 variables, resultaron 11 que explican mejor la probabilidad de pagar un soborno. Variables como el grado de escolaridad y la influen cia de funcionarios y políticos afectan la disposición de las personas a pagar un soborno. Tópicos significativos de este estudio como la retaliación para favorecer votaciones y los favores sexuales para recibir beneficios, aunque incipientes en su estudio, valen su profundización investigativa. Este trabajo sirve de base para motivar estudios con microdatos que ayuden a entender mejor y de manera específica las tipologías de corrupción, a través de modelos que predicen comportamientos del ciudadano del común.Descargas
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